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Abstract In current dairy farming it is possible to run a profitable farm without
having to adapt the system to the needs of dairy cows. In such systems the interests
of the farmer and animals often diverge. Consequently, specific animal welfare
problems occur. Foot disorders in dairy cattle are an illustrative example resulting
from the specific methods of housing and management in current dairy farming.
Foot disorders and the resulting lameness are considered the most important welfare
problem in dairy farming. However, these foot disorders not only typify welfare
problems related to certain housing systems, but they also lead to the premature
culling of cows. The assessment of the impact of foot disorders on the welfare of
dairy cows raised the question of whether premature culling affects animal welfare
since it affects the longevity of a cow. We argue that this aspect of longevity is
morally relevant as an animal welfare issue. In this paper we aim to explore whether
longevity is both (a) a morally relevant aspect in the discussion on killing animals
and (b) a constitutive element of animal welfare. In other words, we aim to explore
whether longevity is an independent moral argument in an animal welfare discus-
sion. We claim that longevity is not merely important as an indicator of animal
welfare, but is also a constitutive element of animal welfare. We argue that we need
a more integrated approach to animal welfare and that an assessment that includes
the aspect of time is necessary. This view involves a shift from views on animal
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welfare in terms of functioning or feeling well to a view on animal welfare that
includes the aspect of natural living in which species-specific development is
important. To show the impact of these points of view, we look at the practical
implications for choices concerning the management of foot disorders in dairy
cattle.
Keywords Animal welfare  Longevity  Dairy cow  Foot disorders
Introduction
Over the last few decades animal production, including dairy farming, has increased
and specialized considerably, leading to intensification and scale enlargement. In the
Netherlands, the average milk production in the past 10 years has increased from
almost 7,500 l per cow per year to approximately 8,000 l nowadays (LEI1). In the
same period, the number of farms has decreased while the number of cows per farm
has increased from an average of 60 to 75 dairy cows per farm (LEI2). A labor and
cost-effective housing system for such large herds of dairy cows is the cubicle
housing system. Currently the main housing system in the Netherlands, it consists of
cubicles where dairy cows can lie and rest and walking alleys, which mostly consist
of concrete (slatted) floors. In these housing systems approximately 80% of the
cows have one or more foot disorders, and about one-third of these cows become
lame in a year (Frankena et al. 2009; Somers et al. 2003). Due to the incidence,
duration and severity of these foot disorders and the resulting lameness, these
problems are considered the main welfare issue for dairy cattle kept in cubicle
housing systems (Algers et al. 2009; Anonymous 2001).
Foot disorders may cause long-lasting and intense pain. Consequently, the animal
will experience difficulties in walking, lying down, and standing up (Cook and
Nordlund 2009), affecting the ability of dairy cows to perform their natural behavior
and fulfill species-specific needs. Furthermore, foot disorders affect other aspects of
the cow’s functioning, e.g., a reduced milk production (Warnick et al. 2001) and a
diminished reproductive performance. As a result, cows suffering from clinical foot
disorders have a higher probability of being culled (Machado et al. 2010). Even
though the majority of foot disorders occur subclinically without causing lameness
(Dyer et al. 2007), this ‘‘does not imply that an animal is not suffering’’ (Somers
2004).
In order to prevent or treat foot disorders, farmers, foot trimmers, and
veterinarians are regularly confronted with the question of how this problem
should be addressed. Should the foot disorder be treated or should the cow be culled
or euthanized? Culling means the removal of a cow from the farm, in general for
slaughter. A visibly lame cow, however, needs to be euthanized on the farm because
of animal welfare and food security reasons and will therefore be destroyed instead
of slaughtered for meat. In addition to the influence of specific economic
1 LEI http://www3.lei.wur.nl accessed March 2011.
2 See footnote 1.
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circumstances, the answer to these questions on how to treat foot disorders depends
on one’s view on animal welfare and touches upon the issue of longevity. Culling or
euthanizing because of lameness implies the decision to end the life of an animal
prematurely, i.e., before the end of a normally intended productive life, either
because of direct welfare reasons or because the animal is not producing well and/or
costs the farmer money and time (Booth et al. 2004).
In this paper the aspect of longevity implies the duration of life in terms of the
intended lifespan of an animal. This topic has received considerable attention in the
past few years. In the context of sustainable farming and improving farm
management, dairy farmers aim to have robust and healthy cows that lactate easily
and abundantly. Moreover, concern about the lifespan of dairy cattle has been put
forward by the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC 2009), who stated that a
2-year increase in lifespan would be desirable and possible. This would create a
lifespan of 8 years, which equals a productive life of 6 years. Such an intended
lifespan should be possible because a dairy cow can reach the age of 20 or more. In
this paper we focus on the role of longevity before the cow reaches the intended life
span because in Dutch society most people accept slaughtering animals for food
(Rutgers et al. 2003).
While assessing the welfare impact of this most important welfare problem in
dairy farming, the question emerged as to what extent premature culling has an
impact on dairy cow welfare. It is agreed that a short lifespan can indicate an
affected welfare (Broom 2007). In this paper we aim to go one step further and
explore whether longevity is both (a) a morally relevant aspect in the discussion on
killing animals and (b) a constitutive element of animal welfare. In other words, we
aim to explore whether longevity is an independent moral argument in an animal
welfare discussion.
We apply our analysis of longevity as a morally relevant welfare issue to the
above-mentioned problems of foot disorders in dairy cattle. Our choice for this
focus is not because foot disorders are the only problems in dairy cattle that lead to
premature culling. Fertility problems would be important in this context too (e.g.,
Ahlman et al. 2011). However, foot disorders and lameness are highly important
welfare problems in dairy farming that (a) are currently underestimated (e.g., Leach
et al. 2010) and (b) lead to other health problems and dilemmas related to longevity.
Modern Animal Farming and Related Animal Welfare Issues
In general, it is currently possible to run a profitable farm that genuinely contributes
to food security and food safety without having to adapt the housing system to the
(behavioral) needs or interests of the individual animals. Consequently, the interests
of farmer and animal diverge and give rise to animal welfare problems like
behavioral and social restriction, overcrowding, and production-related diseases
specific to the systems the animals are kept in (like foot disorders and lameness in
dairy cattle). In situations in which the interests of farmer and animal diverge,
problems of animal welfare do not merely result from cruelty or ignorance but they
also start in the conflict between the interest in producing safe and cheap food in
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sufficient quantities and the interests of the animal (Rollin 2004). Nonetheless, the
problems of animal welfare in general and, more specifically, the issue of foot
disorders cannot be seen as a conflict of interests only (cf. Ohl and Van der Staay
2011). A clear moral dimension underlies the conflicts of interests themselves and
the proposed answers to these conflicts. It is not only a matter of paying due respect
to these interests, i.e., striving for what is most suitable for all involved parties, but it
also touches upon fundamental moral questions of whether animals belong to our
moral community and what we owe to animals. At this point, there is a plurality of
views. The answers to the basic question of whether animals are part of our moral
community are extremely diverse. Consequently, there are also many ideas on the
content and relevance of animal welfare and on how to solve the current questions
of animal welfare in animal production.
Thus the problem that started with a conflict of interests is rooted in a plurality of
moral views on what we owe to animals. This plurality results in different views on
animal welfare.
As the aim of this paper is to analyze whether longevity is a morally relevant
issue within an animal welfare discussion, an analysis of longevity in relation to
animal welfare is needed. In the next sections we discern six normative views that
help to analyze longevity as a moral issue. First, we shortly discuss two views that
link the moral importance of longevity to the value of life rather than to animal
welfare. Second, we make a more detailed analysis of four views on longevity in
relation to animal welfare. Finally, we draw conclusions on the relevance and
implications of longevity as an animal welfare issue.
Longevity, the Value of Life and Respect for Individuality
A first view that considers longevity as a morally relevant aspect starts with the idea
of respect for life. Respect for life, according to Taylor (1986), means that life as
such is worthwhile protecting if a being has a ‘‘good of its own.’’ From this
perspective interfering in the lifespan of a living being that has a good of its own is
morally problematic as it affects the good of the animal and runs counter to the duty
to pay due respect to each being that has a good of its own. However, to come to this
conclusion, this view on respect for life does not need to refer to animal welfare.
Thus in this view longevity is a morally relevant aspect but not as an issue of animal
welfare.
A second view starts with ‘‘respect for individuality’’ in which those who are
subject-of-a-life have inherent worth3 and as such are worthwhile protecting (Regan
1983). Therefore, interfering in the life span of a subject-of-a-life is a no-go area.
Animal capacities like having a future orientation, awareness, or self-awareness are
relevant if these capacities are a condition for a being to be defined as subject-of-a-
life and therefore give much importance to longevity. However, just as with a
3 Regan speaks about inherent value, but this has a stronger claim than the classical use of the concept as
introduced by Lewis (1946). Therefore, we speak of inherent worth.
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Taylorian account, the line followed by Regan will grant longevity moral
importance but not as an issue of animal welfare.
According to these views of ‘‘respect for life’’ and ‘‘respect for individuality’’ the
question of longevity raised in the welfare assessment of the treatment of foot
disorders is appropriate because it is a morally relevant aspect in the discussion on
killing animals; nevertheless, it is not genuinely linked to animal welfare. Moreover,
the relevance of longevity is not considered to be specific to housing or
management-related animal diseases (like foot disorders). The ‘‘respect for life’’
and ‘‘respect for individuality’’ views consider keeping animals for production aims
highly problematic, if not fully unacceptable. An evaluation of this latter normative
claim is beyond the scope of this paper. However, these views do not directly
explain why longevity is also mentioned in animal welfare discussions by people
who appear to have no fundamental problems with keeping animals for food
production. Therefore, we now wish to look at normative views in which animal
welfare plays a central role.
Longevity and Animal Welfare
In the practice of animal production, welfare issues arise since animal interests are
at stake. As Yeates (2009) states; ‘‘… one condition for an issue being a welfare
issue is that its assessment as an issue involves (or ought to involve) an evaluation of
states with regard to an animal’s interests.’’ In line with what we have claimed about
interests in the introductory section on the conflicts in the practice of animal
production, speaking about the interests of animals is also not a value-free act.
Starting animal welfare discussions from the viewpoint of animal interests perfectly
shows the interrelation of the normatively and biologically based elements of animal
welfare.
Both biological and normative assumptions define to what extent an animal has
interests, what these interests are and what they imply for our dealings with
animals. The combination of one’s biological and normative value assumptions
leads to specific views on animal welfare and—as we claim—also on whether
longevity is an aspect that has added value in the welfare discussion. This can be
illustrated by combining three views on animal welfare based on biological
knowledge (e.g., biology, ethology, and physiology) with four views based on
moral norms on animals and their welfare. For the biologically based views on
animal welfare, we—following Fraser—distinguish three views: animal welfare as
a matter of functioning well, feeling well, and leading natural lives (Fraser et al.
1997). We are aware that, in practice, these often overlap. However, in essence
they have different biological starting points in which the different views do not
rule out the previous view(s), e.g., when the view on feeling is adopted, the
functioning view continues.
Moreover, these biological views can be related to the four normative views
about animal welfare that we distinguish and that indicate the moral importance of
animal welfare and our duties towards animals. The normative views assume that
sentient beings should (a) be able to function well, (b) feel well, (c) be able to satisfy
Longevity as an Animal Welfare Issue 195
123
preferences, and (d) should be able to develop according to species-specific needs
and capabilities.
If the three biological views on welfare are combined with the four normative
views, we do not end up with a matrix of twelve possible views on animal welfare
because consistency requires a certain balance in biological and normative views. It
would, for instance, be problematic to stress the importance of species-specific
behavior in biological terms but deny the moral importance of satisfying species-
specific needs at the same time. Table 1 shows the relevant views and the role
longevity plays in these views on animal welfare. In the next sections we elaborate
on three roles longevity can play in the animal welfare debate. Starting as an
indicator and evolving into an independent moral argument, the latter making it an
animal welfare issue.
Longevity as Indicator of Animal Welfare
A first view on animal welfare focuses on the functioning and health of the animal;
here welfare implies that the animal is free from diseases and has the ability to
function well, e.g., the ability to grow and to reproduce. Farmers in particular use
this view on welfare when, for instance, they argue that if they take good care of the
animals, the animals will produce well and therefore enjoy good welfare (De Greef
et al. 2006). From this perspective a reference to longevity is not part of the concept
of welfare but is an indicator of welfare. Longevity indicates that the animal’s health
and functioning is not compromised to such an extent that the life span is affected.
This idea of longevity as an indicator of welfare can also be recognized in those
views that include the feelings of animals in the concept of welfare (Broom 1986,
2007; Bracke and Hopster 2006). By stressing the role feelings play in relation to
welfare, some go further by arguing that, in addition to avoiding negative welfare,
positive feelings are essential for animal welfare (Spruijt et al. 2001). This view
often comes with the moral claim that animals—as sentient beings who can feel
pain—should be granted moral status and are legitimate objects of moral concern.
Nonetheless, the emphasis on feelings does not necessarily imply that longevity
plays a role as an independent moral argument in welfare discussions. It is often
considered that death and longevity as such are not an animal welfare issue (e.g.,
Table 1 Relation between biological and normative views on animal welfare and the relation with
longevity. Starting as an indicator and evolving into an independent moral argument
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Broom 1988; Webster 1995). From this perspective, the moral intuition that killing
includes a moral wrong is not denied, but it is argued that longevity is not a
legitimate argument to substantiate this intuition. Those upholding this view argue
that longevity is not relevant because animals have no or an insufficient concept of
time. Consequently, they lack the awareness of their future and cannot weigh
future benefits against current misery. Thus an animal does not comprehend extra
life (cf. Lund and Olsson 2006; Rollin 2006). The argument usually includes the
following steps: a cow on a dairy farm has to be culled anyway. If the animal is
culled in a welfare-neutral way, then there is no harm in killing animals because
for the cow it does not matter whether and at what age it will be culled. Thus
longevity only plays a role as an indicator of (restricted) animal welfare. For
instance, if an animal is culled prematurely because of health and welfare
problems, restricted longevity is often seen as an indicator of reduced animal
welfare (e.g., Broom 2007).
In the case of foot disorders, longevity indicates animal welfare problems if many
cows are culled due to such disorders. Culling healthy cows before the intended
lifespan has been reached is not a welfare issue as such. For instance, when the
farmer wants to replace dairy cows with genetically superior young stock, there are
no welfare problems because killing is not seen as a welfare issue. If a cow has a
foot disorder that is treatable and can result in recovery, a dairy farmer has to decide
whether to treat or prematurely cull the cow. In general this assessment depends on
how likely recovery will be, the probability that the foot disorder will return and to
what extent the cow is affected in its functioning and feeling. Specific decisions
need to be made for the different foot disorders of varying severity. As long as the
killing itself is not seen as problematic for animal welfare and reduced longevity can
only indicate affected welfare, then the decision depends on how the farm-technical
aspects are weighed against the functioning and feeling of the cow. A decision to
bring the cow to slaughter can be seen as a good solution because it will stop the
negative impact on welfare.
This may result in a counterintuitive situation. Because killing the animal is not a
welfare issue and it even might be the preferred option if the cows really suffer or if
they do not function properly from the perspective of production, then a herd-level
welfare assessment might give the impression that such a farm scores well on
animal welfare. Relatively few animals have a health problem at the moment of
assessment. However, in reality this so-called positive result is achieved because the
problems affecting welfare are ‘‘solved’’ by culling or euthanizing the animals
rather than by improving animal welfare by better prevention and earlier treatment
of foot disorders.
Longevity as a Precondition for Animal Welfare
The view on welfare that considers the feelings of animals as the key element of
animal welfare also includes the possibility of considering longevity as a
precondition for animal welfare rather than an indicator only. Sapontzis already
argued that life has important instrumental value, for living things that have interests
(1987, 166–170). Without continuing to live, the animal cannot fulfill its interests.
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From this perspective, a premature death not only implies depriving an animal of its
life, but it also ‘‘deprives it of a future in which it could pursue its interests’’
(Haynes 2008, p, 54). Balcombe (2009) starts from a hedonistic utilitarianism and
argues: ‘‘Pleasure has moral import for practises like factory farming and laboratory
research, for it amplifies the moral burden of depriving animals the opportunity to
lead fulfilling enjoying lives.’’ From a similar normative perspective, Bradley
(2009) states: ‘‘There is no good reason to discount the badness of death for an
animal. If an animal would have had a good life, then killing it is bad for it, even if it
cannot contemplate its future.’’
From this view, being alive is a precondition. It is a condition sine qua non to be
able to feel and to experience positive feelings as something intrinsically good.
Depriving an animal of a positive future harms it because positive welfare is taken
away (Balcombe 2009). Consequently, this view considers lifespan as a relevant
notion in the moral assessment of a practice of animal use because the duration of
life directly influences the ability to have positive experiences.4
It is now possible to explore the implications of the views on welfare that are
based on the animals’ feelings in the case of foot disorders. In comparison to health
and functioning, feelings play an especially important role in deciding whether the
cow has a life worth living (feeling well). Compared to the functioning views, the
affected welfare during the presence of a foot disorder needs to be considered in
addition to the production level and health parameters. The use of analgesics for
lame cows is not a common practice in dairy farming (O’ Callaghan 2002).
Improving welfare by better pain medication and increased cow comfort, like
improving lying and walking surfaces for at least the lame cows, should be given
more attention and put into practice according to the views on feeling. The extent to
which the dairy farmer will implement these measures to promote animal welfare
depends on the practical and economic possibilities as well as the farmer’s
assessment of the negative welfare impact of the various foot disorders. The
decision to cull a cow could also be for the sake of the cow because cows might
suffer too long. This shows that longevity is more than a mere indicator of welfare
but it is still not morally relevant for its own sake. Longevity is a welfare issue that
needs to contribute to the quality of the life of the animal.
Because the aim of this paper is to explore whether longevity is both (a) a
morally relevant concept in the discussion on killing animals and (b) a constitutive
element of animal welfare, the idea of longevity as a precondition does not appear to
meet both conditions. From Sapontzis’s viewpoint and from the viewpoint of
hedonistic utilitarianism, lifespan is not morally irrelevant but it does not serve as a
constitutive element in the moral assessment of animal use or animal welfare. Since
only fulfillment of interests or pleasure are considered to be intrinsically good,
longevity does not play an independent role.
4 A cynical counterargument in relation to (dairy) farming could be that it is questionable in the first
place whether dairy cows have a good life at all. In this paper we assume that keeping dairy cows does not
exclude the premise that cows can have a life worth living.
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Longevity as an Independent Moral Argument in the Animal Welfare Discussion
Preference Satisfaction
Animal welfare defined in terms of animal feelings can be combined with the
normative view on preference satisfaction. In short, this implies that the moral good
entails maximizing preference satisfaction, and that animal welfare holds that
satisfying animal preferences will result in positive feelings. An animal can have a
whole range of preferences to satisfy, including the preference to survive. If this
latter preference is at stake, then (a) longevity should be included in the ethical
assessment of animal welfare (cf. Singer 1993) and (b) longevity can then be seen as
a welfare issue since killing the subject results in the frustration of its preference and
negatively affects the overall welfare.
Nonetheless, one can argue that the added value of longevity for the ethical
discussion on welfare, and especially on premature killing, is still marginal for two
reasons. First, the desire to stay alive is only but one possible preference that needs
to be balanced against other preferences of the animal and those of other sentient
beings involved. A reference to longevity as such is not a sufficient argument to
understand or justify the moral intuition that premature killing is a moral wrong.
This is related to the problem of comparing welfare states. However, at this point
lifespan can make a genuine contribution. To judge what is better or worse in terms
of (overall) welfare depends on what will happen in the future. An example is tail
docking in pigs. Tail docking in pigs is performed regularly on pig farms even
though many farmers do not have any experience with the problem of tail biting on
their farm (De Lauwere et al. 2009). Although the occurrence of tail biting in the
future is not a certainty, to prevent the detrimental effects of this behavior the tail is
docked. The docking itself is painful, but it is not certain whether the procedure is
needed to prevent the even more severe effects of tail biting. Citing examples like
this one Yeates (2009) states: ‘‘It follows from this comparative nature of (at least
much of) welfare assessment that the value of a welfare state may depend not only
on what that state included in itself, but also on what states would otherwise be
present.’’ The assumption that animal welfare is more than only the feeling and
interests of the animal in the present makes it possible to state that future welfare
and future interests will be infringed when the animal is killed. Thus comparing
different states of welfare includes more than the present state of the animal; it is
also about what has been and what will be (Yeates 2009). From this perspective
longevity is more than merely an indicator or precondition of animal welfare. It is a
way to grasp the future preferences of an animal in the process of comparing
preferences.
The second reason that longevity is marginal to the ethical discussion on animal
welfare is that the preference to stay alive and live a long(er) life relates to
consciousness and to the capacity to have a minimum idea of concepts such as life,
death, and the future. This confronts us with some serious empirical questions, i.e.,
is it possible to scientifically determine whether animals do have a future orientation
and, if so, whether they prefer to stay alive? The answers to these questions are still
uncertain. DeGrazia (1996), for example, argues that sentient animals have desires
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and that some of them have a sense of time in terms of a memory (sense of the past)
or a sense of the future (anticipation). He emphasizes that the level of having desires
and a sense of time can be different from that of humans but that the level is not
decisive for acknowledging its moral importance. It is about whether there is some
perception of time or not. If so, then the animal is not stuck in the present and will
have interests in more than present experiences only. Based on empirical findings,
there are indications that animals do have the capacity to have a future orientation.
For instance, Kotler et al. (1999) showed that squirrels can balance present and
future needs when foraging for food for the winter. Of course, this does not result in
conclusive arguments on the capacities of other animals such as the cow with a foot
disorder. However, there are two reasons why we may argue that such a cow can
have preferences about her future. On the one hand, it is likely that a cow, a
mammal as well, has similar cognitive capacities and therefore has a future
orientation. On the other hand, even without conclusive evidence we have a strong
moral reason to treat animals, such as cows, as having the capacity to have
preferences about their future. This is justified based on a precautionary reasoning.
The fact that there is a possibility that animals have some future orientation is
enough to give the animals the benefit of the doubt. This illustrates that—even if we
take the empirical uncertainty seriously with respect to animals’ consciousness—
longevity can serve as an independent moral argument in the animal welfare debate.
The application of this view implies that if an animal has a sense of the future and
if there is future welfare at stake, then this plays an important role in deciding
whether to treat or to cull a cow. It is no longer possible to decide based on the
present situation only. Culling a healthy cow then implies the risk of an affected
welfare because the animal’s potential preference for life will be affected and the
possibility of satisfying future preferences may be frustrated. This also holds for a
foot disorder that is likely to result in full recovery without a long and painful
disease process. According to the view of preference satisfaction, the interests of the
animal in terms of missed future welfare and the preference for life need to be
weighed against the interests of the farmer. Compared to the above-discussed views
on longevity, the premature culling of dairy cows needs justification because of the
welfare impact of living a shorter life. Another consequence is that efforts to prevent
and treat foot disorders have relatively more weight compared to the situation where
longevity is only an indicator or precondition.
The Importance of Species-Specific Development
In the public debate animal welfare is not only framed in terms of functioning and
feeling but it also includes the aspect of natural living. This entails the ability to
perform natural behaviors and fulfill (behavioral) needs that are important to and
characteristic of that species. At this point there has been a clear change in the
perception and evaluation of animals. Cohen et al. (2007) state: ‘‘The relationship
between man and animal has in recent years evolved from a purely functional
relationship in which the animal is valued mostly for its instrumental utility to
humans towards one in which respect for the value of the animal as a being in its
own right plays a significant role.’’ For instance, the cow’s need to walk outside or
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the chicken’s need to have the opportunity to take a dust bath are considered to be
essential elements for a good animal life and therefore necessary to justify animal
use.
The focus on natural living is not restricted to the public debate. It can also be
recognized in the research on animal welfare. The attention to natural living often
starts in a view on welfare that integrally assesses the life of an animal. This implies
that a focus on ‘‘mental state’’ and subjective experiences are combined with
objective characteristics of the quality of life (e.g., whether the animal is able to
perform its species-specific behavior) and satisfaction of preferences during life.
From this perspective, natural living implies that the animal has to be able to live
according to its nature. In other words, the animal has to be able to perform species-
specific behavior. To explain the notion of species- specific behavior, Fraser (1999)
refers to the Aristotelian concept of telos that has been elaborated by Rollin (2004):
‘‘… animals have natures of their own (telos), and interests that flow from these
natures….’’
The emphasis on natural living has implications for the relevance and
applicability of the notion of longevity as a welfare issue. The question is no
longer whether animals suffer from an early death, but to what extent does an early
death frustrate the aspect of natural living and the ability to perform species-specific
behavior. An example of such a view is Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. She
argues that humans and animals have certain species-specific goals and that these
beings should be able to develop these specific abilities and skills in order to flourish
and to live according to their telos. In this view longevity clearly becomes a welfare
issue because the possibility of developing species-specific abilities refers not only
to functioning and feeling in the present—as it is traditionally perceived in the
functioning and feeling views—but it also refers to a certain lifespan. Welfare in
terms of flourishing and living a life that is in line with the telos of that subject
implies a welfare approach that assesses welfare over time and takes an integral
perspective. The aspect of time emphasizes that welfare should be measured and
assessed during a longer period rather than at single time points only. For example,
an elephant’s long-lasting search for food or water in dry areas in order to survive
involves discomfort but fits in the adaptive and natural capacities of the animal.
Consequently, the elephant’s overall welfare over time might not be compromised
because this search is needed to survive and it enables the animal to have positive
welfare in the future and to develop characteristics needed to survive as an
individual and as a species. Consequently, lifespan is a relevant welfare criterion.
The integral perspective, in which more than only the functioning and feelings of
the animals in the present is of importance, implies that the relevance of longevity is
not restricted to the animals’ capacity of being aware of their own future because
flourishing is worthwhile striving for in itself. Because this implies a certain
lifespan, longevity is a constitutive element of animal welfare.
For dairy farming this implies that longevity gets more weight in culling
decisions about healthy cows and cows with a health problem. Farmers and their
advisors are confronted with cases of foot disorders needing a diagnosis about
treatability. Since this diagnosis is not value free, farmers can value the same
situation differently. For example, one farmer might judge a lame cow with a sole
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ulcer not to be a real welfare problem for the animal and he would thus be less
inclined to treat the cow quickly after having discovered it is lame. However,
another farmer might recognize this as a welfare issue and take action. Sometimes
there are clear cases in which all agree that the animal’s welfare is affected very
severely by the disorder and that the life of the animal cannot be improved by
treatment. Then killing can be in the animal’s interest whether you consider it from
the perspective of biological functioning, feeling, or natural living. Based on the
prima facie responsibility to kill an animal that would otherwise have a life worth
avoiding (Yeates 2009), it is necessary to know when there is no treatment or
improvement possible in order to prevent the animal from suffering needlessly
before being killed.
In other cases, the situation is more complicated because of the uncertainty about
the need or the possibility of treating the animal. In those cases the broader view on
welfare requires taking the aspect of longevity into account as an independent
argument. The lifespan of the animals has to be weighted against different interests
in animal food production. The interests of the animals get more weight if one starts
from the assumption that an animal’s ability for species-specific development
should be taken seriously.
This could result in an increased age of dairy cattle because welfare that includes
longevity is given more weight. This requires management and housing that
improves prevention strategies and the treatment of health issues.5 On top of this,
this view meets the moral intuition that killing animals raises moral questions. From
this perspective, there is a clear need to justify the culling of animals because the
lifespan of the animals receives more value than in the more restricted views on
welfare (functioning and feeling). Whereas in those restricted views culling healthy
or treatable animals is not seen as a welfare issue for the individual animal, in the
broader view culling affects the welfare of animals. This means that prematurely
culling dairy cows for farm-technical reasons becomes an animal welfare issue even
if the animal has no direct physical or mental discomfort. Based on this view we can
make a step from longevity as an indicator or as a precondition for animal welfare to
the idea of longevity as a constitutive element of animal welfare. This, however,
requires including the integral lifespan and the development and capacities of the
individual animals in the welfare assessment.
Conclusion
We conclude that longevity should be considered as a constitutive element of
animal welfare rather than as a mere indicator of animal welfare. We have shown
that this view involves two steps.
The first step is moving from welfare as a concept based mainly on biological
knowledge to the notion that animal welfare is based on and informed by biological
5 We are aware that if dairy cows are able to have a longer productive life, the bases and management of
dairy farming need to be reconsidered to prevent potential other or new dilemmas. However, such
dilemmas should not prevent us from discussing the role of longevity in the welfare of dairy cows.
202 M. R. N. Bruijnis et al.
123
knowledge but is equally driven by moral norms. Consequently, what we owe to
animals can be interpreted more broadly than merely preventing physical or mental
discomfort (views on functioning and feeling). It also includes the duties to enable
animals to flourish and live a natural life, which comes with an emphasis on
longevity.
A second step is moving from views on animal welfare in terms of functioning or
feeling well to a view on animal welfare that includes the aspect of natural living in
which species-specific preferences and species-specific development are important.
We argue—by using both normative and biologically based arguments—that animal
welfare should be approached more integrally and that it should be assessed over
time. Therefore, the animals’ adaptive and natural capacities should be a key
element in defining welfare rather than a single focus on the animals’ functioning or
feelings at a certain moment.
This point of view allows us to evaluate the welfare of animals from the
perspective of the whole lifespan of an animal. This interpretation is independent of
the capacity to comprehend life or have a future orientation. It is important that
animals are able to live a life in which they can adapt to fulfill their preferences and
show species-specific behavior.
In the public debate on animal husbandry, this view enables us to understand and
address the moral intuition that killing animals includes a moral wrong even if the
act of killing is performed in a welfare-neutral way. Longevity as a welfare issue
shows that killing should not only be evaluated from the perspective of the direct act
but should also take the future abilities to flourish into account.
In the practice of dairy farming, considering longevity as a welfare issue can be a
useful tool in assessing welfare and managing foot disorders in dairy cattle. It
implies that premature culling, i.e., cull the animal before the end of a normally
intended productive life, is not a neutral act but one that can affect animal welfare
because of its implications for the longevity of a cow. This broadens the scope of
evaluating foot disorders. Rather than merely focusing on whether a foot disorder is
evaluated in terms of the cow’s ability to function in a certain system, this view
requires an assessment in which all the interests of an animal, including those
related to lifespan, are taken seriously.
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